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Abstract
Wireless access points are an effective solution for building scalable, flexible, mobile networks. The problem
with these access points is often the lack of security. Users regularly connect to wireless access points without
thinking about whether they are genuine or malicious. Moreover, users are not aware of the types of attacks
that can come from “rogue” access points set up by attackers and what information can be captured by them.
Attackers use this advantage to gain access to users’ confidential information. The objective of this study is to
examine the effectiveness of the WiFi Pineapple NANO used as a rogue access point (RAP) in tricking users
to connect to it. As part of the preliminary study, a brief survey was provided to users who connected to the
Pineapple to evaluate the reasons why users connect to RAPs. The result of the cybersecurity pilot study
indicated that lack of awareness played an important role. Specifically, users unknowingly connect to rogue
wireless access points that put at risk not only their devices, but the whole network. The information collected
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INTRODUCTION 
Wireless access points provide a cost-effective and easy-to-deploy solution for 
building a flexible, mobile, indoor-outdoor network. Current wireless 
communication standards, such as WiFi (IEEE 802.11n), enable engineers to build 
efficient and cost-effective wireless access points (Pradeepkumar et. al., 2017; Tzur 
et.al, 2015). However, a growing problem associated with wireless access points is 
the need to secure them. Often users connect to wireless access points without 
giving a second thought to whether the access point is genuine or an impostor. For 
instance, if the device is configured to automatically connect to a particular WiFi 
access point via a named SSID (service set identifier) that does not use encryption, 
then the device is imminently vulnerable to rogue access points (RAPs). Attackers 
use this advantage to launch attacks to gain access to users’ confidential data.  
For a RAP to work, the computer system or mobile device must connect to the 
RAP first. Such a connection generally requires user’s intervention provided that 
the WiFi connection is not configured automatically. Switching off the auto-
connect option in user devices will significantly reduce the RAP’s available attack 
surface. Unfortunately, there is a trade-off between convenience and security. Users 
often prefer the convenience of automatically connecting to their preferred wireless 
networks. And many end-user devices, including PC and Mac laptops and most 
mobile phones, will remember the name of an access point and connect to it 
automatically whenever that network is present, unless the user specifically deletes 
that network’s SSID from his or her device.  
The objective of this research is to measure the effectiveness of tricking users 
into connecting to RAPs. Specifically, the research hopes to answer questions like: 
How are users fooled into connecting to rogue access points? And, what can 
network engineers do to better secure networks? In fact, regardless of how secure 
a network is, if a user account is compromised through a RAP, the entire 
organization’s network is at risk. With a better understanding of why users connect 
to rogue wireless access points, network engineers can implement strategies that 
build safer and more secure networks.  
In addition, this research seeks to uncover clues to better educate users on how 
to identify possible RAPs and the dangers of connecting to them. The research 
hopes to show how easy it is to set up RAPs, within minutes, and to intercept 
network communications with an intent to steal sensitive data, as a means of 
educating unwary users of the privacy dangers involved in insecure wireless 
networks.  
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BACKGROUND 
Most studies conducted on the security of wireless access points focus on how 
to identify RAPs in the network and suggest ways to remove them (Agrawal & 
Tapaswi, 2015; Alotaibi & Elleithy, 2015, 2016; Anmulwar et. al, 2014). Very few 
published studies focus on how to protect networks from rogue wireless access 
points, with even less exploration of the reasons why users connect to RAPs 
(Zegzhda et. al, 2017, Zheng et. al., 2014). Currently, several devices capable of 
creating rogue WiFi APs are available on the market. Among the most widely used 
are Ubertooth One, Cape Networks, EyeQ, NetBeez, HackR, and WiFi Pineapple 
(Morrison et. al., 2017; Hill, 2013; Eric Geier, 2018). For this research, we will 
focus on WiFi Pineapple NANO because of its ease of use and cost-effectiveness.  
The anatomy of the WiFi Pineapple is described in Figure 1. WiFi Pineapple 
NANO looks like a USB flash drive, which can easily be inserted into any computer 
or laptop to launch the attack. The device is developed by Hak5 LLC (Hak5, 2018). 
It contains a Micro SD storage expansion slot, a standard USB port, a high gain 
radio, and configurable status LED, among other features. It has several useful 
modules that enable penetration testers to launch various attacks on the clients 
connected to it. For instance, the PineApp module is used to conduct man-in-the-
middle (MITM) and phishing attacks (Morrison et. al., 2017). Overall, this device 
can be set up as a rogue wireless access point within minutes, ready for attack. 
 
 
Figure 1: Anatomy of the WiFi Pineapple NANO (image adapted from 
https://www.wifipineapple.com/pages/nano) 
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The first phase of the proposed design is to set up the rogue wireless access point 
on the WiFi Pineapple NANO. The rogue wireless access point was named “AP_B” 
(real network name redacted) to match a legitimate access point in a network 
controlled by one of the authors. This access point was set up in a home 
environment, specifically a multi-tenant rental shared by five college students, with 
frequent visitors. The point of this phase is to set up the rogue wireless access point 
in a way such that no users would suspect that the AP_B access point is a rogue 
access point. 
Second Phase 
The second phase of the proposed design was to trick users into connecting to 
the rogue wireless access point. As stated, the rogue wireless access point has a 
name similar to the genuine wireless access point. The WiFi Pineapple NANO user 
interface was used to modify the SSID of the rogue wireless access point to AP_B. 
Then, the interface was used to connect the rogue wireless access point to the 
internet through the genuine wireless access point. 
 









       WiFi   
3
Witemyre et al.: Hijacking Wireless Communications using WiFi Pineapple NANO as a
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2018
 
Rogue AP_B    
User device  
 
    
Figure 2: Tricking users into connecting to a rogue wireless access point  
Phase Three 
The third phase of the design was to count how many users connected to the 
rogue wireless access point and possibly find out why users connected to the RAP. 
The rogue wireless access point was connected to a test website that counts the 
number of connections made with it. Also, a link to a short survey was sent to the 
users who connected to the rogue access point to answer the following questions: 
Do you know what a rogue wireless access point is? Where you aware that this is a 
rogue wireless access point? Are you aware of the dangers of connecting to a rogue 
wireless access point? Do you check to see what wireless access points your devices 
connect to? Have you ever had any training or education about connecting to 
wireless access points? 
   
Figure 3: Counting user connections to the rogue wireless access point and 
issuing a survey to users 
Phase Four 
The final phase in the proposed design was to disconnect the rogue wireless 
access point from the home network and collect the feedback from the survey. No 
malicious software was installed, and no user credentials were collected or 
compromised in this research, but users were educated on the WiFi Pineapple tool 
and how it could have been used to steal login information and other sensitive 
personal data, implant malicious code, and the like. 
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RESULTS 
This study examined the effectiveness of the WiFi Pineapple NANO as a rogue 
access point (RAP) in tricking users to connect to it. Unfortunately, the study did 
not get IRB approval for use on campus, because there was no process in place for 
reviewing technology-based or information security projects, so a pilot study was 
conducted in the lead author’s home with multiple college-age housemates. Of the 
pilot study that was conducted, five users connected to the rogue wireless access 
point. All five users filled out the survey that was provided after connection to the 
rogue wireless access point. The results of that survey are listed below. One of the 
five respondents answered “yes” to whether they knew “what a rogue wireless 
access point is.” None of the five respondents answered “yes” to “were you aware 
that this is a rogue wireless access point.” One of the five respondents answered 
“yes” to “are you aware of the dangers of connecting to a rogue wireless access 
point.” Two of the five respondents answered “yes” to “do you check to see what 
wireless access point your devices connect to.” Only one of the five respondents 
answered “yes” to “Have you had any training or education about connecting to 
wireless access points.” 
In the free-form section of the survey, users were “shocked” to discover that they 
had connected to a rogue wireless access point. Not only were they unaware of what 
a rogue wireless access point was, they were unaware of what a man-in-the-middle 
attack was. Users reported being “terrified” to discover the details of what type of 
information could be captured from man-in-the-middle attacks. Users said that they 
would be more careful when connecting to wireless access points in the future. With 
more knowledge about rogue wireless access points, users said they would be on 
the lookout for rogue wireless access points that had similar SSID names to genuine 
wireless access points.  
This experiment conducted in the study has made users more aware of rogue 
wireless access points and the security vulnerabilities that can arise from connecting 
to them. After a basic understanding of what rogue wireless access points are and 
the dangers of connecting to them, it is hopeful that users will be more cautious 
when connecting to wireless access points in the future.  
Finally, this experiment revealed how easily users are tricked into connecting to 
rogue wireless access points and how quickly and easily rogue wireless access 
points can be set up. With just a WiFi Pineapple NANO that costs under $100.00 
and a USB power source, attackers can set up a rogue wireless access point within 
minutes. Attackers using a rogue wireless access point can implement a man-in-
the-middle attack, phishing, and more. A WiFi man-in-the-middle attack can 
monitor a user’s online activity, intercept login credentials, and even steal credit or 
debit card information. Only when users are armed with information on the dangers 
of RAP WiFi hijacking can they hope to defend themselves from RAPs. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to examine the effectiveness of WiFi Pineapple 
NANO used as a rogue access point, (RAP) in tricking users to connect to it. As 
part of the preliminary study, a survey was provided to users who connected to the 
RAP to evaluate the reasons why users connect to RAPs. The result of the pilot 
study indicated that lack of awareness played an important role. Specifically, users 
unknowingly connect to rogue wireless access points that can put at risk not only 
their devices but the whole network. The information collected in this research 
could be used to better educate users on how to identify possible RAPs, as well as 
the dangers of connecting to them.  
The researchers in this study believe that educating users on rogue wireless 
access points and the security and privacy risks of connecting to them could reduce 
the number of users connecting to rogue wireless access points. In the future, we 
plan to conduct a wider study on a university campus, as soon as the Institutional 
Review Board is equipped and able to process cybersecurity-focused research 
projects. We hope the information collected from a large-scale study would further 
improve the understanding of why users connect to rogue wireless access points. 
With a better understanding of why users connect to rogue wireless access points, 
network engineers can build safer and more secure networks.  
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